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Abstract
The objective of the research reported here is to develop a more flexible and comprehensive
policy simulation model for imperfectly competitive international agricultural trade with
various trade and domestic support policies.  The model is a nonlinear imperfectly
competitive spatial equilibrium model formulated as a MCP.  The model is flexible in that it
can simulate the economic effects of the following trade policies:  specific duties, ad valorem
tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies, production subsidies, production quotas,
consumption taxes and price floors, combined with various imperfectly competitive market
structures.  The usefulness of the model is demonstrated with an application to international
wheat trade simulated under several alternative scenarios based on proposals of major
countries as well as the agreement between China and the United States on China’s
participation in the WTO.  The main empirical findings are as follows.  Keeping the
committed 2000 support levels under the current WTO agricultural agreements would be
favorable for wheat producers in the European Community and Canada, but harmful to the
United States wheat sector.  There would be little structural change in the world wheat trade
in a case where China joins the WTO, keeping the other countries’ policies at the committed
2000 support levels.  Likewise, little structural change would occur in the case where the new
WTO agricultural negotiations result in agreements favorable for importing countries.
However, world wheat trade would drastically change under full trade liberalization.  In this
case, the European Community switches from the world’s leading net exporter to the world’s
leading net importer of wheat.  Also, China and India would become major net exporting
countries, and net exports by the United States, Canada, and the Cairns group such as
Australia and Argentina would expand under full trade liberalization.  
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An Economic Evaluation of the New Agricultural Trade Negotiations: A Nonlinear
Imperfectly Competitive Spatial Equilibrium Approach
In December 2000, World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries submitted their
proposals for the forthcoming agricultural negotiations.  It is clear from these proposals that
there is severe friction between importing and exporting countries, as well as between major
oligopolistic exporting countries.  The ultimate outcome that is reached will depend upon
which country or blocks of countries are dominant.  China’s participation in the WTO is also
an important factor affecting the new agreement.
A tool that is important for each member country in developing negotiation
strategies for the new agreement is a generalized policy simulation model.  Such models
estimate the economic effects of alternative agreements, and, to be useful, must be able to
adequately incorporate all of the complicated agricultural policy measures such as tariff-rate
quotas, and combination of specific duties and ad valorem tariffs.  Policy simulation models
used by member countries in past international agricultural trade negotiations include
AGLINK by OECD, DWOPSIM by Roningen (at USDA), IFPSIM by Ohga and Gehlar (at
IFPRI), and various Applied General Equilibrium models (e.g., Anderson, et al.; Rae and
Hertel).  
The above are static and dynamic models for multi-regional and multi-commodity
markets.  Some of these models incorporate PSE (Producer Subsidy Equivalents) and CSE
(Consumer Subsidy Equivalents) as aggregated measures of degree of agricultural support.
However, these models do not separately incorporate various trade and domestic support
policies such as specific duties, ad valorem tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies,
production subsidies, production quotas, consumption taxes and price floors.  In particular,
tariff-rate quotas have become one of the most important WTO policies, but it has been
difficult to incorporate this policy option into these simultaneous equation models due to a
2non-convergence problem.  In addition, these models assume perfectly competitive markets,
which may be problematic since most international agricultural markets (e.g., the world
wheat market) are clearly imperfectly competitive.  Finally, transportation costs have ignored
in these simultaneous equation models, even though transportation costs are important
transaction costs, similar to tariffs, and have a major impact on international agricultural
trade.
Spatial equilibrium models based on Takayama and Judge have also been applied to
policy simulation (e.g., Judge and Takayama; Cox, et al.; Zhu, Cox and Chavas).  While these
models incorporate transportation costs, they can not handle ad valorem tariffs because they
were formulated as quadratic programming problems.  Rutherford introduced ad valorem
tariffs to the model by reformulating it as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP).
Subsequently, Shono introduced other trade policies such as tariff-rate quotas to her spatial
equilibrium model.  However, Shono specified supply (or marginal cost) and demand
functions in linear form as a linear complementarity problem (LCP).  Shono’s model also
relaxed the assumption of perfect competition, but under the assumption that all countries
behave in the same ologopolistic manner.  Both Shono and Rutherford did not introduce
domestic support policies to their models, although these policies influenced international
trade and policy as well.
The objective of the research reported here is to develop a more flexible and
comprehensive policy simulation model for imperfectly competitive international agricultural
trade with various trade and domestic support policies.  The model is a nonlinear imperfectly
competitive spatial equilibrium model formulated as a MCP.  The model is flexible in that it
can simulate the economic effects of the following trade policies:  specific duties, ad valorem
tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies, production subsidies, production quotas,
consumption taxes and price floors, combined with various imperfectly competitive market
3structures.  The usefulness of the model is demonstrated with an application to international
wheat trade simulated under several alternative scenarios based on proposals of major
countries as well as the agreement between China and the United States on China’s
participation in the WTO.
The Model
Consider international trade among n  ( 2≥n ) countries. In each country, there are three
administratively different markets:  (1) a domestic market with no tariffs, (2) an in-quota
import market with lower tariffs, i.e., the so-called minimum or current access market, and
(3) an over-quota import market with higher tariffs.  Products in the three markets are not
differentiated by consumers, i.e., there is only one demand function in each country.
Consumers in each country are assumed to behave as price-takers.  On the other
hand, producers in each country are classified into two types:  (1) a price-taking producer,
and (2) a producer behaving as a Cournot player who maximizes profits with the expectation
that his rivals will not change their supply in response to changes in his supply.  Notations
used in this paper are as follows:
iY : quantity produced in country i ;
d
ijX : quantity supplied to domestic market in country i  ( ji = );
p
ijX : quantity exported from country i  to in-quota market in country j ;
s
ijX : quantity exported from country i  to over-quota market in country j ;
ep
ijX : quantity exported with export subsidy from country i  to in-quota market in country j ;
es
ijX : quantity exported with export subsidy from country i  to over-quota market in country
j ;
4jP : market price in country j ;
( )iii YCC = : cost function in country i ;
( )jjj PDD = : demand function in country j ;
p
jST : in-quota specific duty rate in country j ;
s
jST : over-quota specific duty rate in country j ;
p
jAT : in-quota ad valorem tariff rate in country j ;
s
jAT : over-quota ad valorem tariff rate in country j ;
p
jX : tariff-rate quota in country j ;
iES : specific export subsidy in country i ;
e
iX : upper limit of subsidized quantity exported in country i ; 
iPS : (specific) producer subsidy in country i ;
iY : production quota in country i ;
jP : price floor in country j ;
jCT : (ad valorem) consumption tax rate in country j ;
ijTC : unit transportation cost from country i  to j  ( ji ≠ );
d
ijTC : unit transportation cost inside country i  ( ji = ),
where i  and j  are natural numbers, sj
p
j STST <  and sjpj ATAT < . All demand and cost
functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable.  It is also assumed that unit
transportation costs are constant regardless of quantity shipped, and there is no forwarding
transportation between countries.
Using the above notation, the producer’s profit maximizing behavior in country i
5can be expressed as:
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If the producer in country i  behaves as a Cournot player, the Kuhn-Tucker
optimality conditions for the above maximization problem can be expressed as follows:
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where iα , ijβ , iγ  and iδ  are the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (2), (3), (4), and (5),
7respectively.  If the producer in country i  behaves as a price taker, the term 
j
j
dD
dP  in the above
conditions becomes zero.
For a producer in country i , ijβ  is the shadow price for the right to export to the in-
quota market in country j .  Assuming that the market for this right is perfectly competitive
in country j , producers in all countries should face the same shadow price for this right in
country j .  Throughout this paper, the competitive shadow price in country j  is expressed as
jβ .  A relatively high shadow price means more expansion of tariff-rate quotas in country j
is demanded.  The parameters iγ  and iδ  are shadow prices for the right to produce within
production quotas in country i , and for the right to export within the upper limit of
subsidized quantity exported in country i , respectively.  Condition (11) shows that the
relation 


 −+= ii
i
i
i PSdY
dC δα  holds if there is any production in country i .  Condition (12) shows
that if iα  > 0, then total quantity shipped is equal to total quantity produced.  However, this
condition also allows for excess production even if the marginal cost is positive.  If domestic
support policies are ignored, as assumed by Rutherford and Shono, overproduction could
occur only if the marginal cost is equal to zero.
As described earlier, the market is divided into three administratively different
markets in each country: domestic market, in-quota import market, and over-quota import
market.  Since it is assumed there is only one demand function for each country, the market
equilibrium condition in country j  can be expressed as follows:
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8The spatial equilibrium model consists of conditions (6) to (17) formulated as the MCP.1  The
Nash equilibrium solution for these conditions is the spatial equilibrium solution.  The
solution is found by the pathsearch damped Newton method (Ralph; Dirkse and Ferris;
Anstreicher, Lee and Rutherford).
Theoretically, introducing the conjectural variations concept into the above model
can generalize the model to incorporate any degree of market structure from perfect
competition to monopoly.  However, conjectural variations in the generalized model cannot
be estimated in the same manner as Iwata, or Suzuki, Lenz and Forker, in cases where pijX ,
s
ijX , 
ep
ijX , and 
es
ijX  are zero, and tariff-rate quotas and limits of subsidized quantity exported
are effective.  Therefore, we use the above model without introducing conjectural variations,
and find plausible market structures by simulating a lot of combinations of producers’
marketing behavior according to Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser.
An Application
Because it is one of the most controversial areas of WTO agricultural negotiations, the model
is applied to a policy simulation of international wheat trade.  Five major exporting countries
and areas (United States, Canada, European Union, Australia and Argentina) share about 85
percent of total exports in the international wheat market.  Therefore, each of these countries
and areas is assumed to behave as a Cournot player.  On the other hand, producers in nine
countries (China, Egypt, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria and the
former Soviet Union) are assumed to behave as price takers in simulation. 
Table 1 shows domestic trade and support policies for wheat in each country.  Tariff
rates and tariff quotas represent levels in 2000 committed by each country under the WTO
agreement (USDA, FAS; Dohlman and Hoffman; WTO).  It is assumed that specific export
9subsidies in 2000, calculated by dividing the committed value limit by the committed volume
limit, can be used within the committed volume limit even though WTO agreements require
countries to reduce the volume and value of subsidized export (WTO; Dohlman and
Hoffman).  China’s trade and domestic support policies represent levels applied in 1998
because it is currently a non-WTO member.  Likewise, Russia’ s figures in 1998 are used for
the former USSR.  Specific duty rates and export subsidies are converted into U.S. dollars by
using exchange rates at the end of 1998 (UN; Bank of Japan).
The WTO agreements also require countries to reduce the total Aggregate Measure
of Support (AMS) as opposed to the commodity-specific AMS.  However, instead of AMS,
we use the unit PSE (converted into U.S. dollars) for wheat in 1998 (OECD) as (specific)
production subsidies because we are focusing only on wheat trade.2  Because the unit PSE in
1998 is not available for these countries and areas, the unit PSE’s for Argentina, China,
Egypt, India, Nigeria and the former USSR are, respectively, for the years 1992, 1992, 1992,
1990, 1989 and 1990 (USDA, ERS). 
Floor prices for wheat converted into U.S. dollars are set at the intervention price in
the European Community, the administrated price in Japan and Mexico, and the loan rate in
the United States (OECD).  Although price floors are set at producer prices, this model sets
the price floor at the border price in each country and area by using the relationship that the
border price is equal to the producer price minus unit MPS (or Market Price Support).   In
each country and area with production quotas, the quantity produced in 1999 (USDA, ERS) is
used as a proxy for the volume of production quotas.  The consumption tax rate in 2000 is
used in each country and area.
For an empirical application of the model, demand and inverse marginal cost
functions in each country and area are simplified and specified as follow:
10
(18) ( ) jjjjjjj NPbaNDDD +==
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where jDD  and jN  are quantity demanded and population in country j , respectively; iYY ,
iA , and iPP  are yield, cultivated area and marginal cost in country i , respectively; and ja ,
jb , ic , and id  are parameters.
Per capita demand functions are specified in a linear form for the following reason.
In this application, many combinations of producers’ marketing behavior are simulated in
order to find a good proxy for the actual market structure.  In a case where producers in all
countries and areas form a coalition to monopolize the international markets, the demand
must be price-elastic in all markets.  If a demand function with an inelastic constant elasticity
is used in the model, there is no collusive solution.  Therefore, we use a linear demand
function, which is one functional form with variable price elasticities.
Border prices (OECD; USDA, ESS) are used as market prices for calculating linear
demand functions in each country and area.  Prices for the same years as those for PSE are
used for Argentina, China, Egypt, India, Nigeria and the former USSR.  1998 prices are used
for other countries and areas, deflating by implicit deflators.  Domestic consumption (USDA,
ERS) and population (FAO) are used to calculate the per capita demand in each country and
area.  Per capita demand functions are calculated using these data and long-run price
elasticies for per capita wheat demand for human uses estimated by Ohga and Yanagishima.
As shown in table 2, multiplying the per capita demand functions by the latest (1999)
estimates of population yields the aggregate wheat demand function for each country and
area. 
Producer prices (OECD; USDA, ESS), deflating by implicit deflators, are used as
marginal costs in each country and area.  The cultivated area data comes from OECD.  The
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data years for both producer prices and cultivated areas are the same as the border prices.
Cultivated areas’ response functions to marginal costs are calculated using these data and
long-run price elasticities of the cultivated area estimated by Ohga and Yanagishima.  As
shown in table 2, multiplying the response functions by the latest (1999) estimates of yield
(USDA, ERS) provides the inverse marginal cost function in each country and area. 
Grains are usually transported by ship.  The main type of ship used is the bulk
carrier (called the Panamax type). Transportation is occasional and supply and demand of the
beam determines the freight.  Assuming that the unit transportation cost is constant regardless
of shipping volume, we estimate the unit transportation costs between ports in each country
and area as follows: The main port in each country and area, and the shortest route usually
taken by merchant ships is selected.  The distance of the route between ports is calculated in
terms of nautical miles.  The freight per metric ton and per nautical mile between New
Orleans and Tokyo is calculated, based on the information that the freight cost for grains
between the U.S. Gulf Coast and Japan by bulk carrier (Panamax type) is US$22.4 on
average from 1994 to 1999 (Clarkson).  As shown in table 3, multiplying the calculated
freight cost per metric ton and per nautical mile by the distance of each route provides with
the unit transportation costs among the countries and areas.  On the other hand, the unit
transportation cost inside each country and area is assumed to be zero.
Four scenarios are simulated based on current proposals for the new WTO
agricultural negotiations from major countries, and the agreement between China and the
United States on China’s participation in the WTO (see table 4).  The four scenarios are
representative of a wide range of possible outcomes for the new trade agreements, ranging
from no change to proposals favoring importing countries to proposals favoring exporting
countries.
Scenario 1 is the base scenario that represents the committed 2000 levels of trade
12
and domestic support policies under the current WTO agricultural agreements.  This scenario
is indicative of the current market situation for world wheat trade.  The in-quota ad  valorem
tariff rate in Japan is assumed to be 20 percent, and in Mexico and the United States only
specific duties are imposed on over-quota imports.  It is also assumed that trade and domestic
policies in China and the former USSR shown in table 1 remain unchanged.  All levels of
other domestic policies, population, yield and unit transportation costs shown in tables 1 to 3
are used.  Note that population, yield and unit transportation costs are also used in scenarios 2
to 4.
Under Scenario 2, it is assumed that China joins the WTO and all other trade and
domestic support policies are the same as Scenario 1.  Trade policies in China are assumed to
be the committed levels for 2004 based on the 1999 agreement between China and the United
States.  That is, China establishes 9.636 million metric tons of tariff-rate quotas, and sets the
in-quota ad valorem tariff rate at one percent and the over-quota ad valorem tariff rate at 65
percent.  China’s domestic policies shown in table 1 are used in this scenario.
Scenarios 3 and 4 represent the most extreme outcomes for the negotiations.
Scenario 3 assumes that the new WTO agricultural negotiations result in agreements
favorable for exporting countries.  This scenario is close to full trade liberalization since all
trade and domestic support policies except consumption taxes are eliminated in all countries
and areas.  On the other hand, in Scenario 4, it is assumed that the new WTO agricultural
negotiations result in agreements favorable for importing countries.  Here it is assumed that
export subsidies are eliminated, the tariff-rate quotas are eliminated, and the current over-
quota tariffs are imposed on all imports.  The current domestic support policies are assumed
to remain unchanged in all countries and areas. 
The Results
13
Table 5 shows the spatial equilibrium solution for scenario 1.  First, we solved scenario 1
assuming three different market structures:  (1) a case where producers in all countries and
areas behave as a price taker, (2) a case where they form a coalition to monopolize the
international markets, and (3) a case where they behave as a Cournot player.  Although
solutions in the above three cases are not shown, they were not realistic solutions.  For
example, the first and second cases resulted in highly simplistic world trade structures.  The
second and third cases resulted in extremely high market prices.  As shown in table 5, the
solution that was the closest to the actual world wheat trade structure was the case where
producers in Argentina, Australia, Canada, European Community and the United States are
Cournot players, and producers in the other nine countries and areas are price takers.   
Therefore, we used the fifth case as the basic market structure for simulating all four
scenarios.
The results for the base scenario where the committed 2000 levels remain the same
are displayed in Table 5.  In this situation, the European Community, United States, and
Canada are the largest net exporters (net exports of 18.3, 17.6, and 15.2 million metric tons,
respectively).   Total word trade is almost 120 million metric tons.  While the European
Community is the world’s largest net exporter of wheat in this scenario, it is clear that the
European Community has a high degree of domestic market protection.  The high domestic
intervention price for wheat in the European Community results in a large amount of surplus
stocks, which totals almost 17 million metric tons in the base scenario.  Consequently, there is
tremendous pressure to reduce the size of government stocks through large export subsidies
($1,364 million in the base case).  At the same time, the relatively high market wheat price
makes the European Community a particularly attractive market to other wheat exporters.
This is also reflected in the results by the high shadow price for export rights into this market
($113.60 per metric ton).  Thus, in spite of WTO pressure to expand tariff-rate quotas, the
14
European Community has a strong incentive to restrict wheat imports, as is the case in this
scenario.
A similar situation exists in Canada, which also has a high degree of domestic
protection in the base scenario.  However, Canada supports its wheat market though a price
discrimination scheme operated by the Canadian Wheat Board.  Price discrimination includes
a higher domestic price and a lower export price for wheat, with producers receiving a
weighted-average price based on market utilization.  Indeed, Canadian producers receive the
highest market price for wheat in this scenario of any country ($189.28).  The shadow price
for the right to export into Canada is almost as high as the European Community ($105.99).
As was true for the European Community, the results of the base scenario suggest that
Canada has an economic incentive to resist expansion of tariff-rate quotas.
On the other hand, the United States has a relatively low degree of protection for its
wheat market.  Second only to the European Community in terms of net exports, the United
States has one of the lowest wheat market prices among all the exporters (almost one-half the
market price of Canada and the European Community).  It is clear that the United States
should favor expansion of tariff-rate quotas in the future trade negotiations.
The simulation results for Scenario 2 are reported in Table 6, where China is part of
the WTO and all other member countries are committed to 2000 support levels.  This
scenario does not result in drastically different results from the previous scenario, except that
China would become a net importing country by increasing imports to its upper limit of
tariff-rate quotas.  Consequently, total world wheat trade increases in this scenario from 120
to 129 million metric tons.  However, there is little change in market prices, and no other
significant structural changes in the world wheat trade in this case.  
Not surprisingly, the world wheat trade situation would change considerably under
full trade liberalization (all trade and domestic support policies except consumption taxes are
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eliminated in all countries and areas) reflected by Scenario 3 (reported in Table 7).  Relative
to the base scenario, world wheat trade increases by 47 percent in this scenario to 176 million
metric tons.  Under full trade liberalization, the European Community switches from the
world’s largest net exporter to the world’s largest net importer of wheat (importing 10 metric
tons).  The market price for wheat in the European Community would fall by over 25 percent,
and wheat production decreases by 35 percent compared to the base scenario.  Indeed, the
European Community wheat sector would suffer the largest losses by full trade liberalization.
Canada and the United States remain as the largest net exporters of wheat under full
trade liberalization.  Relative to the base scenario, Canada actually experiences an increase in
net exports (from 15.2 million metric tons to 19.3).  Trade liberalization results in a 23
percent increase in production.  The higher production results in a 25 percent decrease in the
market price in Canada.   Net exports from the United States also expand in the full trade
liberalization case, increasing from 17.6 to 20.2 million metric tons.  Unlike Canada,
however, the increase in net exports is due to a slightly lower domestic demand, which, in
turn, is due to a higher domestic wheat price in the United States.  The magnitude of the
domestic price increase is 34 percent under this scenario.  Prices become higher in less
protected exporting countries, like the U.S., Australia and Argentina, because low export
prices distorted by various protection measures increase under deregulation, while domestic
prices become lower in heavily protected countries, like the European Community, Canada,
and Japan.  Thus, market prices would be leveled in the whole world by a freer trade.   Also,
China and India would become major net exporting countries, and net exports by the Cairns
group such as Australia and Argentina would expand under full trade liberalization.  
The last scenario is the opposite of the third, in that it assumes export subsidies and
tariff-rate quotas are eliminated, the current over-quota tariffs are imposed on all imports, and
the current domestic support policies are maintained (Table 8).  In this scenario, world wheat
16
trade is the lowest (117 million metric tons).  Compared with the baseline scenario, the more
restricted trade barrier scenario results in no significant structural changes in world wheat
trade.  Table 8 also shows that some importing countries such as Japan and Mexico would
have larger increases in their domestic production.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a nonlinear spatial equilibrium model for analyzing policy issues
relating to world trade.  By formulating the model as a mixed complementarity problem, this
model can incorporate a diverse set of trade and domestic support policies.  For instance, the
developed model is capable of including the following policies: specific duties, ad valorem
tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies, production subsidies, production quotas,
consumption taxes and price floors.  Moreover, unlike many previous models that assume a
perfectly competitive market structure, the model developed here can be combined with
various imperfectly competitive market structures.
The usefulness of this model was demonstrated with an application to international
wheat trade.  The model was simulated under several policy scenarios based on proposals of
major countries on the new WTO agricultural negotiations, and the agreement between China
and the United States on China’s entry to the WTO.  
The main empirical findings are as follows.  Keeping the committed 2000 support
levels under the current WTO agricultural agreements would be favorable for wheat
producers in the European Community and Canada, but harmful to the United States wheat
sector.  There would be little structural change in the world wheat trade in a case where China
joins the WTO, keeping the other countries’ policies at the committed 2000 support levels.
Likewise, little structural change would occur in the case where the new WTO agricultural
negotiations result in agreements favorable for importing countries.  However, world wheat
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trade would drastically change under full trade liberalization.  In this case, the European
Community switches from the world’s leading net exporter to the world’s leading net
importer of wheat.  Also, China and India would become major net exporting countries, and
net exports by the United States, Canada, and the Cairns group such as Australia and
Argentina would expand under full trade liberalization.  
The model can be used for policy simulation of international trade under any other
intermediate policy scenarios.  Any other products can be incorporated in the model.  Many
other trade and domestic support policies can also be incorporated in the model, such as
export taxes, production taxes and consumption subsidies, by redefining these policies as
negative export subsidies, negative production subsidies and negative consumption taxes,
respectively.  We also can incorporate price ceilings as well as price floors using the MCP
formulation.  Moreover, transferring shipments from country to country can be introduced in
the model by refining it according to Lin and Kawaguchi.
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Notes
  1 Harker and Pang, Ferris and Pang, and Ferris and Kanzow present excellent surveys on
complementarity problems including MCP and their applications.
  2 Both AMS and PSE consist of monetary transfers from consumers to producers and from
the governments to producers.  One of the differences between AMS and PSE is that PSE
includes “green box” policies, but AMS does not.
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Table 5. Spatial Equilibrium Solution for Scenario 1 (Unit: million metric tons and U.S. dollars per metric ton)
  From        
To Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan
South       
Korea Mexico
New       
Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
Argentina n.a. n.a. 0.088 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.202 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Australia n.a. n.a. 0.140 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.378 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.193 n.a. 0.263 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.728 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.056 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.539 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South      
Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.006 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nigeria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U.S. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.107 n.a. 0.568 n.a. 0.605 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Former 
USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina n.a. 0.560 0.390 0.076 0.042 2.634 5.026
Australia 0.356 n.a. 0.638 0.068 0.690 0.070 3.588 5.322
Canada 0.316 0.589 n.a. 0.725 3.765 0.278 0.044 4.967 8.416
China n.a.
Egypt n.a.
EU 1.397 1.231 2.069 1.811 n.a. 1.253 0.293 0.090 10.402 17.632
India n.a.
Japan n.a.
South      
Korea n.a.
Mexico n.a.
New        
Zealand 0.086 n.a.
Nigeria n.a.
U.S. 1.403 1.314 2.100 1.650 14.264 1.316 0.099 n.a. 15.718
The Former 
USSR n.a.
3.472 3.780 4.397 0.000 5.214 18.397 0.000 5.740 3.613 0.898 0.345 0.000 21.591 52.114
0.417 1.005 1.880 110.340 5.314 43.629 53.787 0.684 0.000 4.219 0.168 0.068 12.298 68.608
3.889 4.785 6.277 110.340 10.528 62.026 53.787 6.108 3.613 5.117 0.513 0.068 33.889 120.722
78.521 118.140 189.280 118.294 101.469 187.136 162.747 155.856 92.171 124.928 115.111 340.613 99.848 114.233
n.a. n.a. 105.987 n.a. n.a. 113.600 n.a. 3.823 n.a. 37.649 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South      Korea Mexico
New        
Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
0.417 1.005 1.880 110.340 5.314 43.629 53.787 0.684 0.000 4.219 0.168 0.068 12.298 68.608
9.018 11.250 19.556 3.728 0.056 36.717 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.086 0.000 39.144 0.000
5.546 7.470 15.159 3.728 -5.158 18.320 0.000 -5.740 -3.607 -0.898 -0.259 0.000 17.553 -52.114
9.435 12.255 21.436 114.068 5.370 80.346 53.787 0.684 0.006 4.219 0.254 0.068 51.442 68.608
9.435 12.255 21.436 114.068 5.370 96.888 53.787 0.684 0.006 4.219 0.254 0.068 52.777 68.608
n.a. n.a. 14.693 n.a. n.a. 101.544 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 n.a. n.a. 25.065 n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.135 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Blank spaces indicate zero.
a. Shadow price for the right to export to the in-quota maraket.
b. Shadow price for the right to export within the upper limit of subsidied quontity exported.
c. Shadow price for the right to produce within the production quota.
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Table 6. Spatial Equilibrium Solution for Scenario 2 (Unit: million metric tons and U.S. dollars per metric ton)
  From        
To Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan
South      
Korea Mexico
New        
Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
Argentina n.a. n.a. 0.104 n.a. n.a. 0.064 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Australia n.a. n.a. 0.124 1.466 n.a. n.a. 0.226 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.284 n.a. 0.124 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.510 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EU n.a. n.a. 4.133 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.401 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South      
Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nigeria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U.S. n.a. n.a. 4.038 n.a. 0.017 n.a. 0.416 n.a. 0.605 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Former 
USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina n.a. 0.390 0.398 0.094 0.032 2.744 5.164
Australia 0.322 n.a. 0.598 0.660 0.056 3.402 5.058
Canada 0.329 0.415 n.a. 0.729 3.801 0.290 0.034 5.044 8.508
China 1.174 n.a.
Egypt n.a.
EU 1.415 1.060 2.104 1.817 n.a. 1.268 0.293 0.079 10.501 17.753
India n.a.
Japan n.a.
South      
Korea 0.006 n.a.
Mexico n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a.
Nigeria n.a.
U.S. 1.367 1.110 1.997 1.606 13.960 1.284 0.086 n.a. 15.435
The Former 
USSR n.a.
3.433 4.155 4.329 9.636 5.148 18.062 0.000 5.741 3.596 0.898 0.287 0.000 21.691 51.918
0.437 0.802 1.912 102.638 5.374 43.797 53.787 0.684 0.000 4.219 0.236 0.068 12.099 68.686
3.870 4.957 6.241 112.274 10.522 61.859 53.787 6.108 3.596 5.117 0.523 0.068 33.790 120.604
79.322 105.655 191.897 94.305 101.801 187.858 162.747 155.856 92.987 124.928 104.976 340.613 100.649 114.994
n.a. n.a. 107.498 16.822 n.a. 113.600 n.a. 27.812 n.a. 35.230 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South      Korea Mexico
New        
Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
0.437 0.802 1.912 102.638 5.374 43.797 53.787 0.684 0.000 4.219 0.236 0.068 12.099 68.686
8.990 11.912 19.558 5.684 0.000 40.824 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 41.921 0.000
5.557 7.757 15.229 -3.952 -5.148 22.762 0.000 -5.741 -3.590 -0.898 -0.287 0.000 20.230 -51.918
9.427 12.714 21.470 108.322 5.374 84.621 53.787 0.684 0.006 4.219 0.236 0.068 54.020 68.686
9.427 12.714 21.470 108.322 5.374 96.888 53.787 0.684 0.006 4.219 0.236 0.068 54.020 68.686
n.a. n.a. 14.693 n.a. n.a. 101.544 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 n.a. n.a. 25.065 n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.135 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Blank spaces indicate zero.
a. Shadow price for the right to export to the in-quota maraket.
b. Shadow price for the right to export within the upper limit of subsidied quontity exported.
c. Shadow price for the right to produce within the production quota.
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Table 7. Spatial Equilibrium Solution for Scenario 3 (Unit: million metric tons and U.S. dollars per metric ton)
  From        
To Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan
South      
Korea Mexico
New       
Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
Argentina n.a. 0.090 0.346 0.252 5.384 0.234 0.234 0.012 0.038 2.256 3.654
Australia 0.250 n.a. 0.390 1.268 0.478 5.714 1.822 0.088 0.342 0.332 0.038 0.044 3.138 3.840
Canada 0.278 0.154 n.a. 0.620 10.326 1.362 0.011 0.513 0.016 0.061 4.899 7.272
China 2.554 1.368 n.a. 1.056 4.488 5.626 1.294 0.050
Egypt n.a. 5.164
EU 1.253 0.731 1.217 3.590 1.558 n.a. 5.241 0.210 0.864 1.030 0.058 0.145 9.748 15.272
India 4.834 8.266 n.a. 2.236
Japan n.a.
South      
Korea n.a.
Mexico 1.787 n.a.
New       
Zealand n.a.
Nigeria n.a.
U.S. 0.977 0.639 1.055 2.664 1.158 16.663 3.584 0.174 0.681 1.005 0.053 0.115 n.a. 11.433
The Former 
USSR n.a.
2.758 4.168 6.163 7.522 9.956 50.841 12.243 6.109 3.181 3.114 0.227 0.403 20.041 48.871
0.323 0.527 0.741 103.226 0.000 22.405 44.701 0.185 0.003 1.884 0.274 0.049 9.645 67.429
3.081 4.695 6.904 110.748 9.956 73.246 56.944 6.294 3.184 4.998 0.501 0.452 29.686 116.300
114.957 124.577 142.142 113.227 130.985 139.008 123.521 115.795 114.398 133.923 126.356 132.091 133.951 142.111
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South     Korea Mexico
New       
Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
0.323 0.527 0.741 103.226 0.000 22.405 44.701 0.185 0.003 1.884 0.274 0.049 9.645 67.429
12.500 17.744 25.512 16.436 5.164 40.917 15.336 0.000 0.000 1.787 0.000 0.000 40.201 0.000
9.742 13.576 19.349 8.914 -4.792 -9.924 3.093 -6.109 -3.181 -1.327 -0.227 -0.403 20.160 -48.871
12.823 18.271 26.253 119.662 5.164 63.322 60.037 0.185 0.003 3.671 0.274 0.049 49.846 67.429
12.823 18.271 26.253 119.662 5.164 63.322 60.037 0.185 0.003 3.671 0.274 0.049 49.846 67.429
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Blank spaces indicate zero.
a. Shadow price for the right to export to the in-quota maraket.
b. Shadow price for the right to export within the upper limit of subsidied quontity exported.
c. Shadow price for the right to produce within the production quota.
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Table 8. Spatial Equilibrium Solution for Scenario 4 (Unit: million metric tons and U.S. dollars and metric ton)
  From        
To Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan
South     
Korea Mexico
New       
Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The 
Former 
USSR
Argentina n.a. 0.564 0.388 0.136 0.082 0.042 2.672 5.082
Australia 0.362 n.a. 0.636 0.140 0.274 0.694 0.070 3.618 5.366
Canada 0.315 0.588 n.a. 0.717 3.966 0.182 0.278 0.044 4.964 8.415
China n.a. 1.890
Egypt n.a.
EU 1.393 1.229 2.125 1.799 n.a. 0.403 1.249 0.336 0.090 10.380 17.605
India n.a.
Japan n.a.
South      
Korea 0.006 n.a.
Mexico n.a.
New       
Zealand 0.086 n.a.
Nigeria n.a.
U.S. 1.399 1.312 2.156 1.638 14.344 0.426 1.312 0.478 0.099 n.a. 15.691
The Former 
USSR n.a.
3.469 3.779 4.281 0.000 5.178 18.450 0.000 3.317 3.615 0.814 0.345 0.000 21.634 52.159
0.424 1.008 1.938 110.842 5.364 43.602 53.787 0.786 0.000 4.262 0.168 0.068 12.276 68.591
3.893 4.787 6.219 110.842 10.542 62.052 53.787 4.103 3.615 5.076 0.513 0.068 33.910 120.750
78.344 117.967 193.492 112.071 100.859 187.021 162.747 590.419 91.990 128.139 114.938 340.613 99.671 114.064
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South      Korea Mexico
New       
Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The 
Former 
USSR
0.424 1.008 1.938 110.842 5.364 43.602 53.787 0.786 0.000 4.262 0.168 0.068 12.276 68.591
8.966 11.160 19.469 1.890 0.000 36.609 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.086 0.000 38.855 0.000
5.497 7.381 15.188 1.890 -5.178 18.159 0.000 -3.317 -3.609 -0.814 -0.259 0.000 17.221 -52.159
9.390 12.168 21.407 112.732 5.364 80.211 53.787 0.786 0.006 4.262 0.254 0.068 51.131 68.591
9.390 12.168 21.407 112.732 5.364 96.888 53.787 0.786 0.006 4.262 0.254 0.068 52.777 68.591
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.135 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Blank spaces indicate zero.
a. Shadow price for the right to export to the in-quota maraket.
b. Shadow price for the right to export within the upper limit of subsidied quontity exported.
c. Shadow price for the right to produce within the production quota.
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